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Abstract
The 1890s saw an explosion of ambitious projects to build a massive 
classification of knowledge that would serve as a basis for universal 
catalogues of scientific publishing. The largest of these were the 
rival International Catalogue of Scientific Literature (London) and 
Répertoire Bibliographique Universel (Brussels). This essay argues 
that one widely influential but overlooked source of the enthusiasm 
for classification as a technology of search and retrieval during this 
period was the emergence of new methods and technologies for 
classifying and keeping track of people, and in particular, the crimi-
nal identification laboratory of Alphonse Bertillon located in Paris.
John Shaw Billings, the doctor, medical bibliographer, and founding di-
rector of the New York Public Library, traveled to London in July 1896 to 
head the American delegation at the first of a series of London confer-
ences to build an International Catalogue of Scientific Literature. In his 
toast at the opening banquet, he speculated that if the gathered delegates 
were completely successful in building the hoped-for Catalogue, “they 
might anticipate a time when men and things and thoughts also would 
be cataloged”:
They might look forward down the vista of years to the time when a 
stranger in Hyde Park would see a passer-by with such a number as 
26.053, and would then at once appreciate his status in every respect, 
and when the novelist would proudly show that his heroine had 26 
points in her character, while a rival writer had only achieved 19. (In-
ternational Catalogue Conference, 1896, p. 250)
Though Billings’s classificatory fantasy of a world in which all individu-
als—whether real or fictional—had their place in a massive database was 
certainly tongue-in-cheek, it raises important historical questions. What   bibliography as anthropometry/csiszar   443
made it possible for this collection of scientists and bibliographers pur-
portedly focused on the journal literature of science to imagine their en-
terprise in terms of the classification of people? What can this tell us about 
what they thought they were trying to accomplish?
During the 1890s a tenacious nineteenth-century European obses-
sion reached its apex. Classifications of knowledge, and of science espe-
cially, were everywhere, gaining the attention not only of philosophers 
but of scientists, librarians, and even internationalist lawyers. Aside from 
their ubiquity, this moment was also distinguished by several ambitious 
attempts to operationalize such classificatory schemes in massive, often 
international, cataloguing enterprises. Classifying the sciences was to be 
made a social technology of scientific order.
It is easy to suppose that the rise of these projects was a rational re-
sponse to the explosive growth of the scientific literature that occurred 
during the second half of the nineteenth century (led by scientific pe-
riodicals). Certainly, there was no lack of scientists who bemoaned the 
runaway growth of journals, the hazards of drowning in print, and the 
potential for knowledge to disintegrate in chaos (Csiszar, 2010a). But 
as historical explanation, the information overload argument comes up 
short. First, the purported cause is not equal to the specificity of the re-
sponse; it is not obvious that the best way to deal with the literature prob-
lem should have been grandiose subject classification projects. Other 
more traditional—some might say more sensible—options existed: better 
specialized disciplinary bibliographies, expanded alphabetical subject in-
dexes, or even relying more on the accumulated knowledge of recognized 
experts. (Indeed, given the ultimate failure of many of these projects, it 
might plausibly be argued that in hindsight universal and detailed clas-
sification was a misguided approach.) Second, such an explanation also 
demands a better characterization of what made this crisis of information 
special; as historians such as Ann Blair have shown, savants have lamented 
the crush of information from at least the invention of printing onward 
(Blair, 2010; Rosenberg, 2003). Why classification? Why the fin-de-siècle?
To understand the enthusiasm for scientific bibliography requires 
looking beyond internal needs of the sciences for more efficient com-
munication. The classificatory turn was part of a broader culture of clas-
sificatory enthusiasm that reigned during the decades around 1900. This 
enthusiasm was evident across several sciences (not simply natural histori-
cal fields, but mathematics, sociology, philosophy, and others), and went 
beyond them as well). Perhaps the most celebrated classificatory practice 
of the era originated not in the natural sciences at all but in the pursuit 
of criminals. In this essay I argue that it is here—specifically in the iden-
tification laboratory of the Parisian Police—that we should look to better 
understand the motivations and inspiration of bibliographer-scientists at 
the turn of the century.444  library trends/fall 2013
From Anthropometry to Bibliography
The London conference for which Billings made his classificatory toast 
had been convened by the Royal Society of London. The self-styled oldest 
scientific society, in connection with the Foreign Office, had gathered to-
gether delegates of several nations and British colonies to begin to forge 
an international agreement as to how to reorganize the scientific world in 
print. It was the first of several conferences in London leading to the inau-
guration of the International Catalogue of Scientific Literature, which fi-
nally became operational in 1901. While the main office of the Catalogue 
was in London, there were regional bureaus scattered across Europe, 
many British colonies, North America, and Japan. The Catalogue, in book 
form, covered seventeen branches of science and was distinguished by an 
incredibly elaborate subject classification that had been pieced together 
by expert committees of scientists and bibliographers beginning in 1896 
(Fuchs, 2004; Csiszar, 2010a, pp. 350–425). But this massive venture was 
just one prominent instance of a broader movement. Among the Royal 
Society’s major competitors was a group based in Belgium called the Insti-
tut International de Bibliographie, inaugurated in1895 by international-
ist lawyers Paul Otlet and Henri La Fontaine (Rayward, 1975; Rayward, 
2010). Although the scope of their Répertoire Bibliographique Universel en-
compassed far more than the natural sciences, and the motivations of Ot-
let and La Fontaine had as much to do with international peace as scien-
tific organization, the overlap was enough to produce massive tensions. 
Especially prominent was that while both groups wanted to construct an 
elaborate subject classification of all scientific knowledge, they utterly 
disagreed about how to go about doing so. The Institut International in 
Brussels early on decided that the decimal system of the American Melvil 
Dewey would be the basis of their future triumph. The system was expand-
able, stable but flexible, and international. True, Dewey’s classification 
was not “scientifically accurate,” but what stable system could ever be so? A 
usable standard was needed, and Dewey would do well as the basis for an 
expanded universal classification of all knowledge.
Billings’s use of decimal call numbers in his fantasy of total classifica-
tion was a transparent allusion to Dewey’s system. Decimals were looming 
ever larger in European discussions regarding the problem of bibliogra-
phy. The interest in Dewey was driven by Otlet and La Fontaine, but there 
were others who were independent promoters of the system in England 
(Rayward, 1983), and the Belgians were attracting adherents to the cause 
across Europe. The Royal Society itself had begun experimenting with 
classification in 1894, and their Oxford cataloguing consultant, George 
Burch, had recommended giving Dewey a try. Indeed, the preliminary 
classification schemes that they worked out started from a slight alteration 
of the Dewey system. Their first attempt looked like this; here, the only   bibliography as anthropometry/csiszar   445
major change from Dewey’s classification of the natural sciences is that 
Palaeontology is replaced by physiology.1
500 Natural Science
510 Pure Mathematics
520 Astronomy
530 Physics (including Meteorology and Crystallography)
540 Chemistry
550 Geology
560 Zoology
570 Botany
580 Physiology
590 Ethnology
But for all its grandeur, little about Dewey decimals implied the clas-
sification of people, or even the broader philosophical ambitions that Eu-
ropean cataloguers seemed to entertain. Dewey himself warned the Royal 
Society against getting carried away with their classifications:
Science will never stand still and a classification is only a great series of 
pigeon-holes in which to file papers. The man who insisted on tearing 
his desks and study to pieces every few years and grouping the pigeon-
holes over again would be looked upon as a little lacking in balance. 
If our friends could recognize that a classification for practical use by 
a great body of people was really like a great set of pigeon-holes, and 
not try to have it meet all their philosophical theories, we should get 
over the greatest difficulty, for my study long ago convinced me that 
the philosophical side of the classification was a minor consideration.2
Dewey’s advice was that keeping science in order was basically like keeping 
the desk of a man of business organized, so that whatever they did, they 
should avoid getting philosophical. But Dewey was not optimistic; could a 
summit stocked with eminent European scientists hold themselves back 
from the metaphysical temptations that had foiled so many classifiers? “I 
am fearful from some of the discussion I have seen, that the conference 
may be led off on questions of philosophical or scientific accuracy,” he 
wrote to the Society, “and that the experiments and corrections will de-
velop a degree of impatience, if not actual disgust, that will lead to wreck-
ing the entire plan.”3 Dewey’s prediction turned out to be at least partly 
correct: the question of classification was the focus of countless disputes 
for years, not simply between advocates of the rival projects, but internally 
among adherents of each project as well, and nearly led to both projects’ 
premature demise on several occasions.
  How to explain the peculiar flavor of the classifying debate in Europe 
circa 1896? The pragmatism of Dewey’s system and hardware—he had 
also founded the Library Bureau to sell the equipment with which to do 446  library trends/fall 2013
the classifying (Wiegand, 1996, pp. 70–71, 234–242)—was by no means 
the only imaginative resource the would-be bibliographers drew on. The 
influence of Dewey merged not only with the powerful philosophical tra-
dition of classifying knowledge but with an equally compelling classifica-
tion system that had just taken Europe by storm: this was the crimino– 
anthropometric system built by the French criminologist Alphonse Bertil-
lon (Cole, 2001, 32–59; Sekula, 1986; Cochart, Haroche, & Bonnet, 1987).
By the 1890s, Alphonse Bertillon had become well known across Eu-
rope for his pioneering scheme to identify recidivists by cataloguing physi-
cal descriptions of convicts. His father, Louis-Adolphe Bertillon, had been 
a well-known anthropologist; the school of French anthropology had long 
worked with human measurement techniques and instruments in their 
attempts to establish an (ever-elusive) objective classification of human 
races (Blanckaert, 2001; Wartelle, 2004). Alphonse had one day hit upon 
the idea that something similar might be used to classify, and thus iden-
tify, individuals for more immediately practical purposes. While police in 
other cities had developed routines for recording the physical traits and 
peculiarities of criminals, what was important about Bertillon’s system was 
that he developed a scheme of classification that allowed, in principle, 
for speedy retrieval of records. As he put it himself, “the solution to the 
problem of judicial identification consists less in finding new identifying 
characteristics of individuals than in the discovery of a method of classifi-
cation” (Bertillon, 1893a, xv).
According to Bertillon’s method, a set of nine (later eleven) standard 
measurements was taken of an individual’s body and each measure was cat-
egorized according to some discrete scheme (often short-medium-long). 
The information was placed on an identification card, along with a detailed 
physical description and photographs, and then filed in the card archive 
according to a place determined by the results of those several measure-
ments. Given a set of measures, an investigator could inspect precisely those 
cards which matched the profile and check for a matching photograph 
or physical description (the so-called portrait parlé). Rather than searching 
through thousands of photographs and files, search might be limited to a 
few dozen or less. This allowed, Bertillon claimed, for a fast and reliable 
determination of whether a given individual had been previously arrested. 
(fig. 1 shows a rendering of the casiers used to store Bertillon’s fiches.)
Bertillon’s alleged success in identifying repeat offenders for the Paris 
police caused his name to spread widely. Anthropometric laboratories 
sprang up in Europe, North and South America, and even Japan (Mansuy 
& Mazliak, 2011). In England, Francis Galton applied the same technique 
of search and retrieval but focused all measurements on the character of 
an individual’s fingertips. Galton also elaborated a general statistical the-
ory of classification to explain the inadequacies of Bertillon’s own system 
in comparison with his own.4  bibliography as anthropometry/csiszar   447
Fingerprinting ultimately overtook Bertillonage as the method of 
choice in criminal identification, but not before Bertillon himself became 
something of a household name. His fame reached beyond the problem 
of recidivism and was, for a time, emblematic of the power of classification 
as a general science of search, retrieval, and surveillance. As early as 1885, 
in remarks that were translated into both English and German, Louis Her-
bette, chief of the French system of penitentiaries, suggested that Bertil-
lon’s system might serve modern states as the basis for a comprehensive 
system of personal identification. He suggested they might “give to the 
inhabitants of a country, to the soldiers of an army, to travelers in distant 
lands, individual records or cards, identifying marks allowing for a deter-
mination or proof of who they are in any situation.” (Bertillon, 1887, 298). 
He also pointed out potential uses in regulating life insurance policies, in 
identifying those who had suffered injuries, or in keeping tabs on those 
whose had fallen into insanity. Bertillonage would “fix the human person-
ality, giving every human being an identity, an individuality that is certain, 
durable, invariable, always recognizable, and which can be established with 
ease” (Bertillon, 1887, p. 299). Over the next decades, several states did de-
velop identification practices of just this sort (Kaluszynski, 2001; Kaluszyn-
ski, 2002). The French, for example, eventually established a system di-
rected at containing the movements of nomadic populations (the Carnet 
Figure 1. Rendering of the file room in the Paris criminal identification laboratory. 
Source: L’anthropométrie judiciaire à Paris en 1889 (Lyon: A. Storck, 1890, p. 13).448  library trends/fall 2013
anthropométrique of 1912 [Filhol, 2011]), while the U. S. Army adopted 
a version of Bertillonage as a means of identifying soldiers (Alden, 1901).
The public celebrity of Bertillonage within and outside of France 
reached its peak beginning in 1893. That year, his criminal identification 
service was given a prominent place in the French pavilion at the World’s 
Columbian Exhibition in Chicago (Bertillon, 1893b). Periodicals across 
Europe and America published excited, sometimes sensational, reports 
on the celebrated new “Science of Identification” (Vincent, 1894, p. 73; 
Spearman, 1893; Tarbell, 1894) that was thriving in Paris and elsewhere. 
That same year, Arthur Conan Doyle had Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Wat-
son discussing “the Bertillon system of measurements,” with Holmes ex-
pressing “his enthusiastic admiration of the French savant” (Conan Doyle, 
1893, p. 460). Bertillon was becoming a household name.
It is at just this moment that scientists began to discuss in earnest the 
possibility of building massive bibliographical catalogues of scientific lit-
erature. In March 1894, the Royal Society deployed a circular to scien-
tific institutions across the world to gauge their interest in cooperating 
on an international catalogue of science. The chemist Henry Edward 
Armstrong took a leading role in promoting the plan. In his Presiden-
tial Address to the Chemical Society of London that month, he argued 
that an international, classified catalogue of science was not only sorely 
needed but wholly feasible. To make his case, he appealed not to previous   
bibliographical enterprises but to Bertillonage: “We are told that by the 
Bertillon system, dealing with the card records of 90,000 convicts, it is 
possible . . . to ascertain whether a prisoner has been before convicted 
. . . with considerable, if not absolute, confidence.” Once measurements 
are taken, “his card will be found in a drawer containing only about 400. 
Surely, we ought to be able to devise a system which would equally limit 
our search” (Armstrong, 1894, p. 366).
Problems of search and retrieval in the sciences did seem to present 
analogies to the problem of recidivism. Natural historians, in particular, 
were tormented by the scourge of synonymy, whereby plant and animal 
species were constantly being rediscovered and renamed, in part because 
collectors had no systematic means of confirming that the specimens they 
turned up had not already been described. How to be sure what was al-
ready known (Csiszar, 2010b; Daston, 2004)? Paul Otlet, director of the 
Institut international de bibliographie, though he disagreed with Arm-
strong and the Royal Society on so many points regarding the nature of 
classification, did agree that Bertillonage was among the most important 
precursors of their enterprise. In promoting the advantages of the deci-
mal system, he drew on Bertillonage to illustrate the central concept of 
his own enterprise:  bibliography as anthropometry/csiszar   449
Decimal classification thus constitutes a perfect method for organiz-
ing materials for retrieval [localisation]. It is not without analogy to the 
system of anthropometric identification devised by M. Bertillon and 
which is in place in the great capitals of Europe to general approval. 
It corresponds to this essential principle of bibliographical ordering: 
a place for everything and everything in its place. It is, moreover, a 
rational arrangement: this idea is indeed the essence of the system. 
(Otlet and La Fontaine, 1895, p. 30)
Where Armstrong and the Royal Society overstepped by attempting to 
invent a scientific classification, Otlet was inspired by Bertillon to imagine 
the general practice of classification itself as a science.5
Otlet not only promoted the parallels between bibliography and criminal 
identification but took steps to enroll Bertillon himself as a collaborator in 
his burgeoning movement. He first wrote to Bertillon in late 1895 after writ-
ing the above piece, to inquire what Bertillon thought about the striking 
parallels he had described.6 The next spring, he paid a visit to Bertillon’s   
anthropometric laboratory at the Paris Prefecture of Police to learn from 
the master himself. He reported being stunned by the “mathematical preci-
sion” of Bertillon’s operation, which he could only hope would rub off on 
his own cataloguing enterprise. He also attempted to convince Bertillon 
that his system could be made even more efficient by being reworked in 
terms of decimals. Each division into short/medium/long would corre-
spond to numbers (1/2/3) and then linked together in a standard order. 
He gave a suggestion for how this translation might be done:7
Chiffre du 1er rang Longueur de tête  –184  1
  185–190 2
  191– 3
Chiffre du 2e rang Largeur de tête   Petite  1
  Moyenne 2
  Grande 3
Chiffre du 3e rang Longueur du Medius  Petit  1
  Moyen 2
  Grand 3
. . .    
Chiffre du 8e rang Couleur de l’oeil   a  1
  b 2
  c 3
  d 4
  e 5
  f  6 bleu
  g 7
  h 8
A number such as 213.132.26, then, “would correspond to the index card 
of individuals who fell into the following divisions”:450  library trends/fall 2013
  Longueur de tête moyenne  2
    Largeur du tête petite    1
      Grand medius        3
        Pied petit           1
          Taille moyenne            2
            Auriculaire moyen            2
            Yeux biens                6
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Soit 213.132.26.
Otlet argued that such a system would make for a more efficient and natu-
ral way to keep the index cards in order, and would provide flexibility to 
extend the system if new measurements were added to it in the future. 
Otlet’s decimalization of Bertillonage did not amount to much more than 
a cosmetic change in record keeping, but it was symptomatic of a strong 
desire to bring compatible systems of ordering to as wide a variety of activ-
ities as possible, from scientific objects, to bibliography, to human beings.
  Bertillon himself was not as convinced of the universal applicability 
of the decimal system. It was precisely the drive for maximum precision 
alluded to by Otlet that he objected to: “anthropometric measures can-
not be recorded with absolute precision, since there is always a gap of 
approximation between the figures recorded at different times on the 
same individual.” Despite the bibliographers’ fantasies, anthropometry in 
practice actually depended on imprecision, for unlike documents, people 
might change over time, and there was a danger that the same individual 
might end up being assigned more than one decimal number.8 Bertillon 
was proud of the extension of his system to the identification of people 
and citizens in general, but that was as far as he was willing to go. He thus 
rejected one of the key implicit assumptions that drove Otlet and his allies 
in their quest for universal bibliographical order, that there was a science 
and practice of classification that transcended its particular applications. 
While Otlet himself accepted that bibliographical classification, being 
conventional, could not be expected to be philosophically accurate, he 
nevertheless believed that classification itself ought to be viewed as a sci-
ence, in the sense that there were systematic principles and procedures 
underlying its correct practice.
The Discovery of Literary Identities
Another Parisian correspondent of Otlet’s, Marcel Baudouin, was more 
optimistic about the potential for classificatory synergy. An on-again-off-
again ally of Otlet’s, Baudouin was an information services entrepreneur. 
In 1895, independent of both Otlet’s Institut and the Royal Society, he 
founded an office in Paris called the Institut de Bibliographie Scienti-
fique, which he hoped would become a one-stop shop for scientific infor-  bibliography as anthropometry/csiszar   451
mation in France (Csiszar, 2010a, pp. 417–425). The Institut purported to 
include a circulating library for scientific publications, a copying service, 
on-demand translation, and even an outfitter of personal scientific librar-
ies. But its focus was its bibliographical card service. The Institut’s staff 
would classify new scientific books and articles as they were received, and 
would write up index cards that they would send to subscribers based on 
their particular disciplinary interests. Like Otlet, Bertillon’s classification 
also began from Dewey, though to Otlet’s dismay he insisted on tamper-
ing with certain basic characteristics of the system.
Inspired by the American Index Medicus associated with John Shaw Bill-
ings, Baudouin began by focusing on medical literature, with plans to 
branch out to other branches of science as his staff and revenue grew. 
Baudouin was by no means the only one offering such a service to scien-
tists at around that time, and his business did not last a decade, but he 
may have been the most ambitious. He claimed that his process could 
instantaneously provide doctors and scientists with “the most complete, 
most perfect bibliographical documents available anywhere” (Baudouin, 
1895, pp. 708–709).
  In 1898, at the height of his business’s success, Baudouin sought to 
branch out with a new service: identifying the authors of anonymous sci-
entific publications. In announcing his new plan, Baudouin noted that 
among his classified archive, he had already gathered together two thou-
sand anonymous pieces (Baudouin, 1898, p. 650). As scientific publishing 
had come increasingly to embrace the standard format of the authored 
scientific paper, the existence of anonymous articles was increasingly seen 
as an anomaly, a threat to scientific responsibility and to bibliographical 
order. Baudouin took his language directly from Bertillonage, describing 
an elaborate method for the “Rapid Discovery of Literary Identity” by the 
use of special bibliographical directories. He claimed that through his sys-
tem, the author of an anonymous work, or at least his personality, could 
be revealed “by studying, not the length of his humerus or his fingers, 
nor his photographic silhouette, but the reduction to cards, you might al-
most say photographically, of his works and their principal external traits” 
(Baudouin, 1898, p. 655).
  Baudouin carefully laid out the various cases of author-less texts one 
might be faced with: works that had single authors (Monoanonymes), those 
that had multiple authors in which individual sections were written indi-
vidually (Polyanonymes faux), multiauthor works written on behalf of some 
organization, such as a government body (Polyanonymes vrais), and works in 
which authorship had been partially revealed, through initials (Anonymes   
à initiales) (Baudouin, 1898, pp. 651–653).
He sketched out a classificatory scheme according to form of publica-
tion, place, journal venue (if applicable), subject/discipline, chronology 
(broken up in twenty-five-year segments), and, finally, style. In fact, it was 452  library trends/fall 2013
the latter that seemed to capture the spirit of Baudouin’s hopes: while his 
scheme began with bibliographical data, it progressed, via the analysis of 
style, toward identifying and thus categorizing types of scientific authors. 
Even when names were out of reach, personality types might still be found, 
with the right sort of detective work. In this conception, bibliometrics was 
not simply analogous to the successes of criminal anthropometry, but be-
came a form of anthropometry itself:
The anthropometrician classifies the human body; The Bibliographer 
who deals with anonymous works classifies not so much the brains of 
men, but in some sense the photographic traces of the functioning of 
their brains, that is to say, the productive works of their intelligence. 
(Baudouin, 1898, p. 655)
As it happened, Alphonse Bertillon himself had entered the business of 
literary identification through the graphical analysis of handwriting (Ber-
tillon, 1897). Baudouin’s bibliographical anthropometrics would take the 
natural next step by pursuing a textual forensics of the mind.
There is no evidence that Baudouin got very far in this ambitious new 
enterprise. The success of his Institut was reaching its peak at the time he 
drafted the plan; the next year he took over the production of the Index 
Medicus when its American funding lapsed (Kunz, 1979), which presum-
ably left little time to develop his literary identity service. But the pros-
pects of his organization gradually declined, and Baudouin was out of 
business a few years into the new century. Still, his plan to make bibliogra-
phy into a spiritual anthropometry was the most elaborate statement of a 
widespread idea. It was, after all, the famous founder of the Index Medicus, 
John Shaw Billings, who dreamed of a “time when a stranger in Hyde Park 
would see a passer-by with such a number as 26.053, and would then at 
once appreciate his status in every respect.”
Of Men and Things and Thoughts
Classifications of science, both philosophical and bibliographical, reached 
a frenzied peak in the decades surrounding 1900, led by the two massive 
international cataloguing projects of the Royal Society and the Institut 
International de Bibliographie. Imagining categories that flitted back and 
forth between people and documents was a widespread phenomenon, 
and indeed was an island of tacit consensus in a sea of bibliographical 
discord. Why?
Histories of early information science have tended to tell of the emer-
gence of this new profession as having occurred when bibliographical 
pioneers finally threw off the shackles of metaphysics and took full posses-
sion of bibliographical classification as a practical tool with its own theo-
retical foundations. In this vision, Melvil Dewey is a crucial forerunner,   bibliography as anthropometry/csiszar   453
and his European disciples are founding figures (Rayward, 1998). But the 
story turns out to be rather more complex. The enthusiasm for biblio-
graphical classification was part of a broader enthusiasm for classification 
that saw the merger of the philosophical problem of classification and 
the practical problem of the organization of documents in a new empiri-
cal problem that swallowed both traditions. Dewey, the efficiency-loving 
American, was one of many sources. The anthropometric imaginary was 
another. In fact, the popularity of the latter among the bibliographers, I 
believe, went deeper than the high reputation of Bertillon’s crime labo-
ratory. For the debates about how to catalogue science were, in fact, as 
much about how to group and organize people as they were about how to 
organize documents. The scientific enterprise was just coming into view 
as a social enterprise itself, one that might be governed by its own regu-
larities and evolutionary laws. Classifying the literary output of science 
might be a means of gaining an empirical handle on this social evolution. 
A few years later, the American logician Charles S. Peirce stated the idea 
best when he outlined his own plans for a classification of science: “My 
notion is that what we call ‘natural classification’ is, from the nature of 
things limited to natural objects. . . . What is a science as a natural object? 
It is the actual living occupation of an actual group of living men.”9 When 
scientists and bibliographers convened in 1896 to discourse of catalogues 
and of call numbers, their thoughts turned to science as a natural object 
in just this sense.
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cal and practical classifications of science, while arguing against the view that these two 
approaches toward classification should or could be kept distinct.454  library trends/fall 2013
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